Thursday, January 30, 2014

Remembering Jesus

On page 384 of Jesus Remembered, James Dunn writes
The phrase ‘kingdom of God’ occurs regularly in the Evangelists’ recollection of Jesus’ words—thirteen times in Mark, another nine times in the material shared by Matthew and Luke (q/Q), a further twenty-eight times in tradition distinctive of Matthew, and a further twelve times in tradition attested only by Luke. It is hardly possible to explain such data other than on the assumption that Jesus was remembered as speaking often on the subject.
I wonder if this is really so. Wouldn’t anyone who believed that Christ had risen have interpreted that event as a sign that the kingdom of God had drawn near? Isn’t it an obvious possibility that this phrase was used by the earliest believers to explain the meaning of the visions that some of them were having and that its use was later ascribed to Jesus.

Moreover, suppose that Jesus had been a revolutionary Zealot preaching armed rebellion rather than an apocalyptic preacher and that he referred only very rarely to the kingdom of God.  After his crucifixion, some of his followers experienced visions and interpreted their meaning theologically.  They would naturally try to remember anything that Jesus had said that related--even tangentially-- to the theological interpretation of his life and death.  Those few occasions when Jesus had spoken of the coming kingdom of God would have been discussed thoroughly and would become the focus of the movement's message regardless of how much it figured in Jesus' preaching.

In short, regardless of whether the historical Jesus spoke of "the kingdom of God," a lot, a little, or not at all, we shouldn't be surprised to find it becoming a big part of the traditions concerning his life, because those traditions existed in order to preach the meaning of his death.   I think that is very easy to explain the frequency with which the Evangelists used "kingdom of God" regardless of how often Jesus actually did.

Monday, January 27, 2014

Why I See No Need to Explain the Apostles' Experiences

Imagine that the only record of a key moment in a football game is a still photograph that seems to show a defensive back committing pass interference on a receiver.  However, the referee didn't throw a flag on the play. Is it possible to be confident that the referee blew the call?

One reason not to put too much weight on the photograph is that anyone who regularly watches televised sports knows that different camera angles provide different information.  A call that appears terrible on first viewing is often confirmed as correct when the play is seen from a different angle or a seemingly good call turns out to have been bad.  A different angle might show much more space between the defender and the receiver than the photograph shows.  It might show that the pass was in fact uncatchable. Moreover, a video might show that the receiver's motion and momentum were unimpeded despite the proximity of the defender so that he still had a fair opportunity to catch the pass.
It might help somewhat to get the opinion of football experts on the photograph, but probably not as much as one might like.  The problem is that the photograph lacks the information that might provide greater certainty.  No matter how many people agree that it appears to be pass interference, there is no way to be sure that they would reach the same conclusion if they saw the play from better angles.

What might be useful is to find similar photographs of plays where video is available from several angles.  Then it would be possible to determine how frequently the impression given by the photograph is confirmed and how often it is contradicted.  If it turns out that the referee's call is confirmed as often as it is undermined, then the best that could be said is that such photographs only raise the possibility that the referee erred.  However, if it turns out that the referee's call was confirmed nine out of ten times, then such photographs would have to treated as providing little or no evidence of a missed call.

I am frequently asked by Christian apologists "How do you explain the experiences that led the apostles to believe that Jesus had been raised from the dead?"  My usual response is "Why should I expect to explain them?"  The evidence I have is simply not sufficient to give me any certainty about what really happened.  I can think of any number of possible scenarios that, having been passed along an unknown number of times in an oral tradition, might have led to the stories found in the gospels.

The problem I have is similar to the one of the still photograph of the football play.  The angle I have on the events doesn't contain the information I need to reach a conclusion.  What I have is mostly the anonymous accounts of fantastic events based on unknown sources removed an unknown number of times from the original events.  I only have a single first person account, but that account is vague and lacking in details.  All of these accounts are written from the perspective of true believers in those fantastic events .  What I would need to have any confidence in any conclusion about what happened would be sources closer to the events including sources with a skeptical perspective.

In fact, I have good reason to think that the kind of evidence I have is particularly unlikely to be accurate.  Just as I might find photographs of similar football plays where video replays are available, I can find fantastic stories told by true believers years after the events where information closer to the events is available.  I can compare the stories about aliens written in the 1980's to the primary source material concerning the events in Roswell in 1947.  I can compare the stories that the Mormon Church tells today about its early years to the accounts that non-Mormons gave of their dealings with Joseph Smith. I can compare the stories that the nuns told me in the 1960's about the miracles witnessed by thousands at Fatima in 1917 to the much smaller number of vague and inconsistent accounts that were actually given at the time.  I can observe that the fantastic accounts are invariably undermined when better information is examined and I can conclude that they are unreliable as evidence, just as I would conclude that the photograph was unreliable evidence if the video replay invariably confirmed the referee's call.

Of course comparing the New Testament accounts of the apostles' experiences to still photographs is far too generous to the former.  They are more like stick figure drawings of the play by people who heard about it years later.

Tuesday, January 7, 2014

On the Multiplicity of Historical Jesuses

One of the ways I know that astrology and feng shui are bullshit is that different “experts” analyzing the same data reach widely different conclusions. The fact that New Testament scholars differ so dramatically in their portraits of the historical Jesus certainly doesn’t prove that he didn’t exist, but it seems like adequate reason to question whether their methodology is sufficient to tell us much of anything about him. That being the case, it is reasonable to take their absolute certainty about his existence with a grain of salt.

Saturday, December 21, 2013

It's Not the Horizons

Michael Licona spends a lot of time talking about a historian's horizons, but he is like a man trying to use a ruler to measure the radon levels in his basement. Unfortunately, it's not possible to measure radon with a ruler, but Mike doesn't want to hear that. When someone tries to explain how a ruler works, he accuses them of having an anti-radon bias.  He insists that they need to be open to the possibility that radon gas exists, like he is.  What he can't seem to understand is that it's not a question of whether radon exists.  It's a question of having a tool that allows you to measure it.

Among the tools historians use to investigate the past is the principle of analogy which assumes that events of the past do not differ in kind from those in the present.  Since events in the present appear to follow natural law, it is difficult to see how any historian could conclude that a miracle occurred in the past as there are no events within present knowledge or experience with which to draw analogies.   If an event is unlike anything in the historian's knowledge and experience, he has to conclude that it is unlikely.  The principle of analogy doesn't preclude supernatural causes of events, but it has a very difficult time detecting them just as a ruler has a hard time detecting radon gas.


Naturally Licona doesn't like the principle of analogy, but some of his objections to it are pretty silly.
Numerous established modern beliefs would fail according to the principle of analogy. For example, we could not conclude that dinosaurs existed in the past.
Licona doesn't seem to get that it's the principle of analogy. Big reptiles are analogous to small reptiles so there they pose no problem.

He also has some stupid reasons for thinking the principle of analogy unnecessary.
If historians do not follow the principle of analogy, will they find themselves embracing superstitions? I see no reason why this must be the case if proper historical method is applied. We do not interpret Aesop's Fables as history because a highly plausible natural hypothesis is available considering genre. Miracle-claims must be judged on an individual basis. Accordingly the threat of superstition should not prohibit historians from proceeding while being careful to apply sound method.
I don't know about Licona, but the reason I don't interpret Aesop's Fables as history is because they are filled with talking animals.  It is because Aesop's Fables are filled with talking animals that I conclude that the genre is something other than history.  I don't need to decide on the genre before I decide whether to believe that the animals really talked.

Licona is correct that the principle of analogy makes it difficult to recognize unique events, but that's just the nature of historical inquiry.  The historian can only say what probably happened in the past and it is always going to be difficult to assess an unprecedented event as more likely than a common one.  

Licona keeps accusing the principle of analogy of ruling out God and miracles a priori, but it doesn't. If present knowledge and experience could be shown to include miracles worked by God and a past miracle could be shown to be similar to those that are currently known, the principle of analogy could be used to argue for the historicity of the event.  Unfortunately, as Licona's criteria acknowledges, establishing a miracle requires knowledge of that it is the kind of thing God would want to do.

Licona wants to claim that the historicity of the resurrection turns on whether one believes in a God who acts in history, but he can't because he knows perfectly well that a belief in such a God doesn't lead to the conclusion that He acted in any particular situation.  Again and again, Licona is forced to acknowledge that belief in a God who wanted to raise Jesus from the dead is required.
However, if we take into consideration the existence of a God who may have reasons for raising Jesus from the dead, the probability that Jesus rose is increased significantly. For example, if a historian holds that God does not exist, she will also hold that Jesus' resurrection is implausible. However, if she holds that God exists, that he acts within human history and that Christianity is probably true, she is most likely to hold that Jesus' resurrection is quite plausible
Why should a historian take into consideration the existence of a God who may have reasons for raising Jesus from rather that a God who may have reasons for not raising Jesus?  Of course if we beg the question by holding that Christianity is true, we will conclude that the resurrection is plausible.
The failure of billions who have not returned from the dead only warrants the conclusion that the dead are not raised by natural causes. The Christian claim is not "Jesus is risen by natural causes." The claim is "Jesus, the Son of God, is risen" or "God raised Jesus from the dead."40 Can historians a priori conclude that if Jesus is divine he cannot raise himself or that if God wanted to raise Jesus from the dead there is a high degree of probability that he cannot have done so? It would not appear so. 
Actually, the success of billions who have remained dead warrants the conclusion that the dead stay dead, period.   Until someone can be shown to have returned from the dead, their is no justification for limit those who are not raised to "those who are not raised by natural causes."  Of course it is impossible to show that a God who wanted to raise Jesus from the dead couldn't do so but neither is it possible to show historically that God would want to do so.
Since we are bracketing the question of worldview in relation to RH [the Resurrection Hyposthesis], it is difficult to name widely accepted truths that suggest RH. In order to illustrate this point, let us presuppose for the moment that supernaturalism is false. In this case, we can conclude that RH is implausible, since it is certainly not implied by other accepted truths, namely that metaphysical naturalism is an accurate representation of reality. Conversely, let us presuppose for the moment that supernaturalism is true or that God or some supernatural being wanted to raise Jesus from the dead. In this case, we can conclude that RH is very plausible, since it is certainly implied by the accepted truth that a supernatural being wanted to raise Jesus.
Ta Da!  By presupposing that God wanted to raise Jesus from the dead, Licona has turned it into "the accepted truth."

As Dagoods pointed out on a comment on an earlier post "Just because a god could transform me into a giant pickle, does not create an expectation a god would."  Being open to the possibility of a God who can act in history may make the resurrection not impossible, but it does nothing to make it any more than infinitesimally probable.

Wednesday, December 18, 2013

A New Historiographical Approach or the Same Old Apologetic Claptrap?

In my last post I looked at Michael Licona's assertion that miracles are subject to historical analysis.
We may recognize that an event is a miracle when the event (a) is extremely unlikely to have occurred, given the circumstances and/or natural law and (b) occurs in an environment or context that is charged with religious significance. In other words, the event occurs in a context where we might expect a god to act.
I call this an assertion rather than an argument because Licona never explains how a historian determines that an event is sufficiently unlikely to satisfy the criteria nor does he explain how a historian determines where God might be expected to act.   He simply asserts that it can be done.

One obvious hypothesis when a person starts claiming to have seen a dead person is that he has experienced a hallucination or some other known psychological phenomenon.  How can a historian possibly conclude that such an explanation for appearance claims is "extremely unlikely."  What evidence could there possibly be? Licona deals with Michael Goulder's hypothesis concerning the psychological basis for the appearance claims quite neatly:
We may likewise note that Goulder's psychoanalysis of those who lived two thousand years ago is a highly problematic exercise. As Craig explains: "Psychoanalysis is notoriously difficult even when the patient is seated in front of you, but it is virtually impossible with historical figures."
TA DA!   Psychological explanations for the appearances are now off the table, not because there is any way to eliminate them or to declare them unlikely, but because we can't put Peter and Paul on the couch. This fits quite nicely with the historical bedrock that Licona declares any theory must explain.
1. Jesus died by crucifixion
2. Very shortly after Jesus’ death, the disciples had experiences that led them to believe and proclaim that Jesus had been resurrected and had appeared to them.
3. Within a few years after Jesus death, Paul converted after a personal experience that he interpreted as a post resurrection appearance of Jesus to him.
Talk about stacking the deck.  If Licona doesn't have to eliminate psychological processes that might give rise to the type of experience in the last two facts, it is not surprising that his resurrection hypothesis is going to come out on top.

Licona resorts to the same trick to undermine Gerd Ludemann's hypothesis:
Psychoanalyzing persons who are not only absent but who also lived in an ancient foreign culture involves a great deal of speculation and is a very difficult and chancy practice. Allison opines that Ludemann's conjectures "are just that: conjectures. They do not constitute knowledge. In recent decades contemporary historians have been more leery than their predecessors of the viability of reconstructing and then analyzing the psycho-histories of men and women long dead .Ludemann appears not to recognize this. Instead, his approach is a methodical skepticism that says, "As long as I can offer a naturalistic proposal that has an ounce of plausibility, I do not need to consider a supernatural one."
Surprise, surprise!  Licona is criticizing exactly what his methodology requires.  Under Licona's criteria, the historian needs to consider any natural explanation that is not extremely unlikely because if he determines that there is one, he is not justified in affirming the historicity of a miracle. I suppose, however, that an explanation with only an ounce of plausibility may be still be deemed extremely unlikely.  Perhaps a cup of plausibility is required before a miraculous explanation can be rejected.  Perhaps the natural explanation requires a gallon of plausibility before it gains priority over the supernatural one. Alas, Licona never explains how much plausibility is enough.

So we can see that Licona is happy to jettison the first half of his historical miracle criteria when it proves inconvenient for his position.  How about the second half of the criteria?  Well, we can see that tossed overboard when Licona responds to Dominic Crossan's ethical objections to the doctrine of the resurrection.

The ethical objection should be offered only after a close examination of the data and a firm conclusion that Jesus did not rise from the dead has been made. Crossan's ethical objection is an emotional, even political, appeal that says, "Can't we all just get along?" But it is not historical. He has put the cart of theological implications before the horse of historical truth.
Once again, Licona is criticizing what his methodology seems to require.  Surely we have to consider the theological implications of the event in question in order to determine whether it is the kind of thing that we might expect God to do.

According to Licona, his approach "differs from previous approaches in providing unprecedented interaction with philosophers of history related to hermeneutical and methodological considerations and applies these to an investigation pertaining to the resurrection of Jesus."  Unfortunately, he still provides no method for determining that Christianity's supernatural claims are any more likely to be true than any others.  It looks like the same old bullshit to me.

Sunday, December 15, 2013

Michael Licona on Proving Miracles

I am skeptical that a supernatural event can ever be established by evidence.

Evidence is an effect from which we infer a cause.  If we find a body with a knife sticking out of its back and the knife has little swirly patterns on the handle, we infer that the person whose fingerprints match those patterns is the person who put the knife there. We can do this because we understand the natural processes of cause and effect that lead to the appearance of those little swirly patterns on objects. Just as importantly, we believe that those natural processes are overwhelmingly consistent, if not invariable. If we thought that those little swirly patterns appeared randomly or by divine fiat, they wouldn’t be evidence of anything. We could not say it was Professor Plum with the knife in the library.

 The intellectual tools by which we draw inferences from evidence use the consistency of natural processes of cause and effect. As a result, they can not identify supernatural causes regardless of whether one's world view allows for them. We do not know what effects require supernatural causes and we do not know what effects supernatural causes are likely to produce.

I have finally gotten around to reading Michael Licona's The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach, which came out in 2010.    I have done so because Kris Komarnitsky was kind enough to supply me a review copy of the second edition of his book Doubting the Resurrection: What Happened in the Black Box? in which he engages with Licona's conclusions on a number of points.   As Licona's book has been so highly praised by Christian apologists, I figured it would contain the best possible explanation of how a historian might go about distinguishing a miracle story that was the product of an actual supernatural event from one that was the product of the usual human shortcomings like superstition, ignorance, wishful thinking, gullibility, exaggeration, and prevarication.

The best they have is pretty bad.  Writes Licona,
We may recognize that an event is a miracle when the event (a) is extremely unlikely to have occurred, given the circumstances and/or natural law and (b) occurs in an environment or context that is charged with religious significance. In other words, the event occurs in a context where we might expect a god to act. The stronger the context is charged in this manner, the stronger the evidence becomes that we have a miracle on our hands, if the historical evidence for the event itself is good. (p.163)
Huh?

The first question I have is how can the evidence for an event be good if it is extremely unlikely to have occurred given the circumstances and/or natural law?  The simple fact that an event is extremely unlikely given natural law must at the very least put the possibility of the event's non-occurrence on the radar.  If as I proposed above, we draw inferences from evidence based on the regularity of natural processes of cause and effect, it is hard to see how we can ever claim to have "good evidence" of an event that is inconsistent with those processes.

The second question is how the hell can a historian identify the contexts in which a god might be expected to act?  What the hell does "significantly charged religious context" even mean?  What basis other than wishful thinking is there to believe that a god, God, an angel, a demon, or any other supernatural being is any more likely to act in such a context than in any other?  On what basis can the historian claim to know the mind of an infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent being?  Not surprisingly, Licona provides no answers to any of these questions.  He simply takes the expectation of God's action as self-evident.